Answers to decision in SBMA case
SPECIAL REPORT - Manila Times
(Part 3, Continued from Monday)
Q#15: What actions did your office make, after such inspection?
A: Again as part of our process, we verbally informed UIGDC and SBGCCI regarding the result of the inspection, with instruction to either effect restitution and/or correction thereof and advised them to submit to the Conciliation and Employee Welfare Division (Labor Department, SBMA, any question on the findings immediately upon receipt of such notice).
Q#16: Did the company take action on the basis of your notice and instructions?
A: Again, there was no response on their part.
Q#17: What did your office do then?
A: Again, we relayed the matter to the Office of the Manager of the labor department of SBMA for the appropriate action. The latter office issued a Notice of Conference addressed to Mr. Jack Hu, requesting the latter to appear for a conference at the SBMA labor department on November 9, 2006. (Attached herewith is a copy of the Notice of Conference October 31, 2006, as ANNEX “F”)
Q#18: What happened after the issuance of the Notice of Conference dated October 31, 2006?
A: After the issuance of the Notice of Conference dated October 31, 2006, SBGCCI through counsel, files a mere Manifestation (a copy of which is herein attached as ANNEX “F”) dated November 20, 2006.
Q#19: Considering all the verbal advise, written notices, and conferences carried out as a consequence of the inspections conducted on May 6, 2005, and September 22, 2006, did the UIGDC and the SBGCCI rectify the violations it had committed; much less complied with their statement of Undertaking?
A: Other than the submission of their statement of Undertaking and further filing a manifestation of its compliance, our records show otherwise. The said undertakings were not complied with despite the given period promised upon by the company. Moreover, notwithstanding the manifestation of compliance filed by the counsel of SBGCCI, there is still no proof of compliance submitted by the company. Thus, there is still a continued noncompliance on the part of UIGDC and SBGCCI.” (Pages 8-11, of Defendant’s memorandum)
8.) As to the Plaintiffs outstanding financial obligations, instead of addressing the same, Plaintiffs submitted a proposal which in effect would convert an amount that is already due and demandable to one that is subject to a suspensive and potestative condition, to wit:
“Our company proposes to pay in good faith the principal amount of P11,638,070 by paying a down payment of P1,000,000. Provided that upon approval of our proposal, SBMA will allow us to sublease portion of our lease area with an undertaking on our part to remit to SBMA 15 percent of the proceeds of the lease to be applied to the principal amount of our outstanding accounts to revert back to 7 percent after fully payment of the principal amount.”
The said proposal readily reveals Plaintiffs insincerity and ploy that they really have no intention to pay SBMA. A down payment of not even close to 10 percent of its uncontested obligation is preposterous, much more when it undertakes to pay the much lofty balance from the proceeds of a sublease that Plaintiffs are imposing SBMA to approve when it reaches such proposal without a choice. Indeed, the proposal did not only convert a due and demandable obligation into one subject to a suspensive condition, much worse, said condition is in effect a potestative one, as payment is dependent on Plaintiffs being able to sublease a portion of their premises.
9.) Indeed, the court’s conclusion that the Plaintiffs have responsibly coordinated and had employed corrective measures to address said violations is bereft of any factual basis. Incidentally, despite of the respite given to the Plaintiffs during the pendency of its application for injunction that is basically form the initiation of the instant complaint up to this day or approximately five long months. Plaintiffs stubbornly failed to address said violations.
c.) That the court’s conclusion that the Plaintiffs are being singled out is bereft of any basis.
10.) The court’s conclusion favoring Plaintiffs contention that they are being singled out is obviously sweeping. As pointed out in Defendant SBMA’s Memorandum, Plaintiffs failed to produce even a single evidence to prove the same. At most, during the injunction hearing, Plaintiffs’ counsel asked each of the Defendant’s witnesses whether if it is only the Plaintiffs which committed the violations they testifies on and whether made similar recommendations as against other locators. Unfortunately for the Plaintiffs, aside from the fact the Defendant’s witnesses testifies that their respective departments had indeed made similar recommendations, logic dictated that to prove that they are indeed “singled out,” Plaintiffs must prove that there are locators so similarly situated as the Plaintiffs are. Simply put, a locator having the same violations only on a specific areas as those of Plaintiffs violations, does not necessarily follow that they are similarly situated. At his point, it is crucial to stress that Plaintiffs violations do not involve a single area but a convergence of violations on different areas. Indeed, Plaintiffs have not establish nor even pointed out any locator similarly situated that would warrant said conclusion.
11.) Worse, Defendant’s evidence particularly the one which delves into plaintiffs financial obligation would show that contrary to their contention, SBMA has been very lenient to the Plaintiffs. This maybe seen in the numerous revisions of payment schemes accorded to the Plaintiffs. In all, as testified to by Ms. Edith Lim-Mrazal, SBMA has extended to the Plaintiffs at least three payment schemes. SBMA has to end this vicious cycle wherein Plaintiffs keep on entering into a payment restructuring scheme everytime Plaintiffs would fail to comply with the current scheme.
d.) That the Court may not grant an injunctive relief that was not asked for by the Plaintiff’s in their complaint.
12.) As discussed in Defendant’s Memorandum, the instant complaint is one of Tender of Payment and Consignation with an application for a Preliminary Mandatory Injunction, wherein Plaintiffs prayed for:
“WHEREFORE, it is respectfully that a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction be issued ordering the defendant, their employee, agents and any or all person acting for and in their behalf to issue payment order, to receive payment of renewal fee and to renew its permit to operate.”
The court is thereby limited into either granting or denying Plaintiff’s application.
13.) The High Court in the case of Asia Transmission Corporation v. Canlubang Sugar Estates (G.R. No. 142383, August 9, 2003) ruled:
“It is also a general principle of law that a court cannot set itself in motion, nor has it power to decide questions except as presented by the parties in their pleadings. Anything that is decided beyond them is coram nonjudice and void. Therefore where a court enters a judgment or awards relief beyond the prayer of the complaint or the scope of its allegations the excessive relief is not merely irregular but is void for want of jurisdiction, and its open to collateral attack.”
14.) Indeed, the injunctive relief applied for one and the one granted by the court are not only diametrically opposed but pertains to two different matters. As such, the same may not be done without any amendment on the complaint. Needless to say, the same may never be done especially in the instant case which is an application for an injunctive relief. No less that the Supreme Court had ruled that injunctive applications are to be “ constructed strictly against the pleader” (Ortigas & Company Limited Partnership v. Ruiz, 148 CRA 326)
15.) Lastly, as stated in the Sheriff’s report dated 13 June 2007 and Defendant SBMA’s manifestation dated 14 June 2007, the SBMA Board of Director’s in its regular Board meeting conducted on 8 June 2007 had decided to pre-terminate Plaintiffs Lease premises. As such, effective around 6 p.m. of June 8, 2007, SBMA is in possession and full control of the lease premises and has been operating the golf course facility under its management.
16.) In view of the foregoing, the act that the injunction seeks to enjoin has effectively been rendered moot and academic. This notwithstanding, the instant Motion is being filed considering that the order is question bares conclusions that are prejudicial to interest of SBMA.
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court that the Order dated 20 July 2006 be SET ASIDE and a new one be issued denying Plaintiffs application for injunctive relief.
Other reliefs just and equitable under the premises are likewise prayed for.
Subic Bay Freeport for the City of Olongapo, 15 June 2007.
Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority
Bldg. 9, Waterfront Road
Subic Bay Freeport Zone
By:
MICHAEL M. QUINTOS
Counsel for Defendant SBMA
(Part 3, Continued from Monday)
Q#15: What actions did your office make, after such inspection?
A: Again as part of our process, we verbally informed UIGDC and SBGCCI regarding the result of the inspection, with instruction to either effect restitution and/or correction thereof and advised them to submit to the Conciliation and Employee Welfare Division (Labor Department, SBMA, any question on the findings immediately upon receipt of such notice).
Q#16: Did the company take action on the basis of your notice and instructions?
A: Again, there was no response on their part.
Q#17: What did your office do then?
A: Again, we relayed the matter to the Office of the Manager of the labor department of SBMA for the appropriate action. The latter office issued a Notice of Conference addressed to Mr. Jack Hu, requesting the latter to appear for a conference at the SBMA labor department on November 9, 2006. (Attached herewith is a copy of the Notice of Conference October 31, 2006, as ANNEX “F”)
Q#18: What happened after the issuance of the Notice of Conference dated October 31, 2006?
A: After the issuance of the Notice of Conference dated October 31, 2006, SBGCCI through counsel, files a mere Manifestation (a copy of which is herein attached as ANNEX “F”) dated November 20, 2006.
Q#19: Considering all the verbal advise, written notices, and conferences carried out as a consequence of the inspections conducted on May 6, 2005, and September 22, 2006, did the UIGDC and the SBGCCI rectify the violations it had committed; much less complied with their statement of Undertaking?
A: Other than the submission of their statement of Undertaking and further filing a manifestation of its compliance, our records show otherwise. The said undertakings were not complied with despite the given period promised upon by the company. Moreover, notwithstanding the manifestation of compliance filed by the counsel of SBGCCI, there is still no proof of compliance submitted by the company. Thus, there is still a continued noncompliance on the part of UIGDC and SBGCCI.” (Pages 8-11, of Defendant’s memorandum)
8.) As to the Plaintiffs outstanding financial obligations, instead of addressing the same, Plaintiffs submitted a proposal which in effect would convert an amount that is already due and demandable to one that is subject to a suspensive and potestative condition, to wit:
“Our company proposes to pay in good faith the principal amount of P11,638,070 by paying a down payment of P1,000,000. Provided that upon approval of our proposal, SBMA will allow us to sublease portion of our lease area with an undertaking on our part to remit to SBMA 15 percent of the proceeds of the lease to be applied to the principal amount of our outstanding accounts to revert back to 7 percent after fully payment of the principal amount.”
The said proposal readily reveals Plaintiffs insincerity and ploy that they really have no intention to pay SBMA. A down payment of not even close to 10 percent of its uncontested obligation is preposterous, much more when it undertakes to pay the much lofty balance from the proceeds of a sublease that Plaintiffs are imposing SBMA to approve when it reaches such proposal without a choice. Indeed, the proposal did not only convert a due and demandable obligation into one subject to a suspensive condition, much worse, said condition is in effect a potestative one, as payment is dependent on Plaintiffs being able to sublease a portion of their premises.
9.) Indeed, the court’s conclusion that the Plaintiffs have responsibly coordinated and had employed corrective measures to address said violations is bereft of any factual basis. Incidentally, despite of the respite given to the Plaintiffs during the pendency of its application for injunction that is basically form the initiation of the instant complaint up to this day or approximately five long months. Plaintiffs stubbornly failed to address said violations.
c.) That the court’s conclusion that the Plaintiffs are being singled out is bereft of any basis.
10.) The court’s conclusion favoring Plaintiffs contention that they are being singled out is obviously sweeping. As pointed out in Defendant SBMA’s Memorandum, Plaintiffs failed to produce even a single evidence to prove the same. At most, during the injunction hearing, Plaintiffs’ counsel asked each of the Defendant’s witnesses whether if it is only the Plaintiffs which committed the violations they testifies on and whether made similar recommendations as against other locators. Unfortunately for the Plaintiffs, aside from the fact the Defendant’s witnesses testifies that their respective departments had indeed made similar recommendations, logic dictated that to prove that they are indeed “singled out,” Plaintiffs must prove that there are locators so similarly situated as the Plaintiffs are. Simply put, a locator having the same violations only on a specific areas as those of Plaintiffs violations, does not necessarily follow that they are similarly situated. At his point, it is crucial to stress that Plaintiffs violations do not involve a single area but a convergence of violations on different areas. Indeed, Plaintiffs have not establish nor even pointed out any locator similarly situated that would warrant said conclusion.
11.) Worse, Defendant’s evidence particularly the one which delves into plaintiffs financial obligation would show that contrary to their contention, SBMA has been very lenient to the Plaintiffs. This maybe seen in the numerous revisions of payment schemes accorded to the Plaintiffs. In all, as testified to by Ms. Edith Lim-Mrazal, SBMA has extended to the Plaintiffs at least three payment schemes. SBMA has to end this vicious cycle wherein Plaintiffs keep on entering into a payment restructuring scheme everytime Plaintiffs would fail to comply with the current scheme.
d.) That the Court may not grant an injunctive relief that was not asked for by the Plaintiff’s in their complaint.
12.) As discussed in Defendant’s Memorandum, the instant complaint is one of Tender of Payment and Consignation with an application for a Preliminary Mandatory Injunction, wherein Plaintiffs prayed for:
“WHEREFORE, it is respectfully that a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction be issued ordering the defendant, their employee, agents and any or all person acting for and in their behalf to issue payment order, to receive payment of renewal fee and to renew its permit to operate.”
The court is thereby limited into either granting or denying Plaintiff’s application.
13.) The High Court in the case of Asia Transmission Corporation v. Canlubang Sugar Estates (G.R. No. 142383, August 9, 2003) ruled:
“It is also a general principle of law that a court cannot set itself in motion, nor has it power to decide questions except as presented by the parties in their pleadings. Anything that is decided beyond them is coram nonjudice and void. Therefore where a court enters a judgment or awards relief beyond the prayer of the complaint or the scope of its allegations the excessive relief is not merely irregular but is void for want of jurisdiction, and its open to collateral attack.”
14.) Indeed, the injunctive relief applied for one and the one granted by the court are not only diametrically opposed but pertains to two different matters. As such, the same may not be done without any amendment on the complaint. Needless to say, the same may never be done especially in the instant case which is an application for an injunctive relief. No less that the Supreme Court had ruled that injunctive applications are to be “ constructed strictly against the pleader” (Ortigas & Company Limited Partnership v. Ruiz, 148 CRA 326)
15.) Lastly, as stated in the Sheriff’s report dated 13 June 2007 and Defendant SBMA’s manifestation dated 14 June 2007, the SBMA Board of Director’s in its regular Board meeting conducted on 8 June 2007 had decided to pre-terminate Plaintiffs Lease premises. As such, effective around 6 p.m. of June 8, 2007, SBMA is in possession and full control of the lease premises and has been operating the golf course facility under its management.
16.) In view of the foregoing, the act that the injunction seeks to enjoin has effectively been rendered moot and academic. This notwithstanding, the instant Motion is being filed considering that the order is question bares conclusions that are prejudicial to interest of SBMA.
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court that the Order dated 20 July 2006 be SET ASIDE and a new one be issued denying Plaintiffs application for injunctive relief.
Other reliefs just and equitable under the premises are likewise prayed for.
Subic Bay Freeport for the City of Olongapo, 15 June 2007.
Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority
Bldg. 9, Waterfront Road
Subic Bay Freeport Zone
By:
MICHAEL M. QUINTOS
Counsel for Defendant SBMA
Labels: arreza, sbma, Subic Bay Golf, taiwan
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