Last year, the United States Quadrennial Defense Review, a public and official document required by the US Congress from the Pentagon to express US military strategy, announced that: "Of the major and emerging powers, China has the greatest potential to compete militarily with the United States and field disruptive military technologies that could over time offset traditional US military advantages absent US counter-strategies."
Capping a series of pronouncements by high-level US officials warning China not to challenge the US as well as a series of actions indicating US moves to encircle China with US military assets and allies, the document confirmed what many had long suspected to be the case: that the US sees China as the rival whose rise it must prevent and whose military power it must contain. One of the countries in which the US has been deepening its military presence in is the Philippines - considered by US analysts as firmly located within what they call "the dragon's lair" - that strategic area around China where decisive battles could erupt in certain war-planning scenarios.
Though the US military officially vacated the Philippines and its mammoth Subic Bay base in 1991, since 2001 it has moved to re-integrate the Philippines firmly within what it now calls its "global defense posture". Despite the US and Philippine governments' efforts to play down their presence, a clearer but still incomplete picture of the extent and depth of the re-establishment of the US's military presence in the Philippines has emerged.
Recurring exercises
First, the US has stepped up deploying troops, ships and equipment to the country, ostensibly for training exercises, humanitarian and engineering projects and other missions, even though its military officially vacated the Philippines and its mammoth Subic Bay base in 1991.
Since 1998, a steady stream of US troops has arrived in the country for regular military exercises involving up to 5,000 troops, depending on the exercise in various locations throughout the country. Through the Visiting Forces Agreement, which was required by the US to conduct the exercises, it was only beginning in 2001 that the number and the size of troops involved jumped significantly. In 2006, up to 37 exercises were scheduled, up from 17 to 24 in the preceding years. [1]
In any given year since then, few are the days or weeks when there would be no US troops somewhere in the country, giving lectures to Philippine troops, participating in large-scale maneuvers, joining command exercises, simulating war games or taking part in other related activities. Compared to any other Southeast Asian country, the Philippines hosts the most number of such exercises and activities. As a result of these continuing deployments, former US ambassador to the Philippines Francis Ricciardone has described the US presence in the country as "semi-continuous". [2]
Though presented largely as efforts to improve the skills of Filipino soldiers, the aim is also to gain strategic ground. As former US Pacific Command chief Thomas Fargo himself has pointed out: "The habitual relationships built through exercises and training and a coherent view of regional security with regional partners is our biggest guarantor of access in time of need ... Access over time can develop into habitual use of certain facilities by deployed US forces with the eventual goal of being guaranteed use in a crisis, or permission to preposition logistics stocks and other critical material in strategic forward locations." [3]
As US troops come and go in rotation for frequent regular exercises, their presence - when taken together - makes up a formidable forward-presence that brings them closer to areas of possible action without need for huge infrastructure to support them - and without inciting a lot of public attention and opposition. For instance, US troops will be able to deploy faster to the South China Sea if they are holding exercises off Palawan or in Zambales than if they were in Hawaii. In the face of domestic sensitivities regarding a permanent US military presence, they would also be able to say publicly that they are only in the Philippines temporarily and that they will be leaving soon. What is left unsaid, however, is that they are also always arriving.
And as US troops depart then come back again, they leave behind the infrastructure that they had built and used ostensibly for the exercises and which could still be of use to the US military in the future for missions different from those for which they were initially built. In General Santos City, for example, the US constructed a deepwater port and one of the most modern domestic airports in the country, connected to each other by one of the country's best roads.
In Fort Magsaysay in Nueva Ecija, where US troops routinely go for exercises, the airport has been renovated and its runway strengthened to carry the weight of C-130 planes. [4] In the southern islands of Basilan and Sulu, venues of Balikatan exercises, the US, through United States Agency for International Development (USAID), has also built roads and ports that can berth huge ships. [5]
Along with troops, an increasing number of ships have also entered the country with increasing frequency, ostensibly for exercises and humanitarian missions. On at least one occasion, it appeared that they even came unannounced and unexpected. [6] According to the US Congressional Budget Office, "[T]he Navy counts those ships as providing overseas presence full time, even when they are training or simply tied up at the pier." [7] Though they come and go, the US military sees their regular and frequent "temporary" deployments as part of its global "posture."
As the US National Defense Strategy states, "Our posture also includes the many military activities in which we engage around the world. This means not only our physical presence in key regions, but also our training, exercises and operations. They involve small units working together in a wide range of capacities, major formations conducting elaborate exercises to achieve proficiency in joint and combined operations, and the 'nuts and bolts' of providing support to ongoing operations. They also involve the force protection that we and our allies provide to each other." [8]
Just-in-time basing
Second, the US has secured arrangements and built infrastructure that would allow it to use ports and airfields to pre-position equipment, secure logistics support and engage a broad range of locally-provided services that would enable it to launch and sustain operations from the Philippines if necessary.
In September 2001, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo granted the US free access to its ports and offered it over-flight rights to its airspace. [9] In November 2002, the US and Philippine governments signed the Mutual Logistics Support Agreement (MLSA), which has been described by researchers with the US Congressional Research Service as "allowing the United States to use the Philippines as a supply base for military operations throughout the region". [10] The MLSA obliges the Philippine government to exert "best efforts" to provide the US logistics supplies, support and services during exercises, training, operations and other US military deployments.
The agreement defines these to include food, water, petroleum, oils, clothing, ammunition, spare part and components, billeting, transportation, communication, medical services, operation support, training services, repair and maintenance, storage services, and port services. "Construction and use of temporary structures" is also covered. [11] In other words, the MLSA gives the US access to the full range of services that the US military would require to operate in and from the country. Also through the MLSA, the US has secured the services that it would normally be able to provide itself inside a large permanent base but without constructing and retaining large permanent bases - and without incurring the costs and the political problems that such bases often pose.
In 2003, an analyst reported that among all Southeast Asian countries only the Philippines has provided a "forward positioning site" for the US to store equipment to be used for regional operations. [12] In August 2005, the Overseas Basing Commission, the official commission tasked to review US basing, identified the Philippines as one of the countries - along with Thailand, India and Australia - in which so-called "Cooperative Security Locations" (CSLs) are being developed by the US in the region. [13] According to the Pentagon, CSLs are a new category of bases that refer to facilities owned by host-governments but are to be made available for use by the US military as needed.
The Philippine government has not disclosed the locations and other details about these CSLs. The airport in Mactan, which now hosts a fleet of US Orion reconnaissance planes, [14] is reported to be one site where Pentagon officials intended to establish such a facility, [15] but this has not yet been officially acknowledged or independently confirmed. Yet Arroyo herself had earlier in July 2001 raised the idea of renting out naval facilities in Subic Bay, an oft-used venue for joint exercises to the US military.
Lockheed Martin, a company often contracted by the US military, was reported to have been waiting for approval to establish a regional aircraft maintenance facility at Clark Air Base. [16] Halliburton KBR, another US corporation that has secured US military contracts, was reported as having been granted in November 2001 a US$100 million contract to convert Subic Bay into a modern commercial port. [17] The company had earlier announced that it was exploring redeveloping the former US Navy Ship Repair Facility in Subic Bay for maritime logistics and ship support services. [18]
Arrangements that combine commercial with military activities, noted then US PACOM Admiral Dennis Blair, "opens up possibilities for the sorts of things that we can work together on in the future". [19] Indeed in a recent thesis for the US Naval Postgraduate School, these arrangements are precisely what were recommended by Thomas Garcia: "not a return to the grand infrastructure of the past" but "the use of only a small logistical facility currently utilized by the commercial ship industry, and the port infrastructure of berths and airfield already in place." [20]
Another option suggested by Garcia was to locate the Philippine Navy in Subic and then allow the US to position its ships inside the nominally Philippine-owned base. [21] Former US PACOM chief Admiral Thomas Fargo had in fact announced plans to use Subic and Clark for the transit of personnel and trans-shipment of equipment, as well as a re-fueling post for US ships from Honolulu, Guam, or the US West Coast bound for the US base in Diego Garcia. [22] Though nothing has since been heard of these plans, the reports indicate that such options are still on the table. Given the US government's policy of partial disclosure, it's also possible that such plans have gone ahead unannounced and possibly in other places, in the manner that Kaplan had described above. [23]
The terms of the MLSA and the establishment of CSLs reflect the US's increasing emphasis on just-in-time logistics support and pre-positioning of equipment to ensure that US forces - dispersed as they are around the world, often far away from main bases where they store equipment and tap all kinds of services - are always ready and rearing to go. It is not so much the size of the base that matters, but whether it can provide the US military with what it needs and when it's needed.
As the Council on Foreign Relations recently pointed out, "While host nation support often carries the connotation of basing, its role of staging and access is perhaps more critical. Support for port visits, ship repairs, over-flight rights, training areas and opportunities, and areas to marshal, stage, repair, and re-supply are no less important for both daily US presence in the region and for rapid and flexible crisis response." [24]
Forward operating unit
Third, the US has already succeeded in stationing indefinitely a US military unit in the Philippines. Since 2002, a unit now called the Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines (JSOTF-P) has been deployed to and based in Zamboanga, Basilan, Sulu and other areas in Mindanao in the southern Philippines.
While initially presented as part of on-again, off-again temporary training exercises, it has since been revealed that this unit has continuously maintained its presence in the country for the past six years. With the Philippine government not giving a definite exit date, and with US officials stating that this unit will stay on as long as they are allowed by the government, it is presumed that it will continue to be based in the Philippines for the foreseeable future.
In an apparent effort not to draw attention to the unit, the US and Philippine governments have publicly revealed little about the real nature and mission of the JSOTF-P, except to project it as part of the US-led "war on terror" and to highlight the humanitarian and civil engineering projects that it undertakes. The media, for the most part, have through the years uncovered little about the unit and have reported on it by following the description offered by the US and Philippine governments. Most of what has since been gathered about the unit has come from US military publications and specialist sources not intended for general public consumption.
Headquartered in the Philippine military's Camp Navarro in Zamboanga City, [25] but with its personnel sent to various locations, the JSOTF-P has effectively established a new form of US military presence and basing in the country. When it was publicly revealed in August 2007 that the US Department of Defense via a US military construction unit had granted a contract to a company providing "base operations support" for the JSOTF-P, [26] the US Embassy admitted that the US was setting up allegedly "temporary"structures for "medical, logistical, administrative services"and facilities for "for them to eat, sleep and work" [27].
The Philippine's own Visiting Forces Commission also confirmed that the US maintains "living quarters" and stock supplies inside Philippine military camps. [28] Renowned US military historian Robert Kaplan, who revisited the JSOTF-P inside Camp Navarro in 2006 described these structures as signifying a "more hardened, permanent arrangement".[29] According to a US military publication, the JSOTF-P's area of operations covers about 20,000 square kilometers, covering the entire island of Mindanao and its surrounding islands and seas. [30] According to various media reports, the number of troops attached to the unit has ranged from between 100 and 450, but it is not clear what the actual total number is for any specific period. [31] US Lieutenant Colonel Mark Zimmer, a JSOTF-P public affairs officer, said it varies "depending on the season and the mission." [32]
US officials have consistently maintained that US troops belonging to the unit "train, advise and assist" the Philippine military in their war against alleged terrorists in the country. Though denying that they are involved in "actual combat", US officials also repeatedly assert that they have the right to shoot back when under fire. In US military publications, US troops belonging to the unit have characterized their mission as "unconventional warfare", "foreign internal defense" and "counter-insurgency". [33]
In fact, they have been reported to have exchanged gunfire with and to have been attacked by alleged insurgents. [34] There have also been numerous sightings of US troops in the vicinity of active military operations, some of which have been confirmed by Philippine military officials. [35] At the height of Philippine military offensives against insurgent targets in August 2007, US soldiers were photographed by a press wire agency leading a military convoy in Sulu. [36]
All of this has served to challenge Philippine government claims that the US troops are not involved in the fighting. As Colonel Jim Linder, former head of JSOTF-P, has stated, "We're very much in a war out here ... We'll spill American blood on Jolo. It's only by luck, skill and the grace of God we haven't yet." [37] Referring to their bases in the southern Philippines as "forward operating base-11" and "advanced operating base-921", [38] the JSOTF-P corresponds to the new kind of forward-deployment that the US has introduced as part of its ongoing effort to realign its global posture and overhaul its offensive capabilities.
In terms of profile and mission, the JSOTF-P is similar to the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-Horn of Africa), which was established in Djibouti in eastern Africa in 2003 and also composed mostly of Special Forces. Like the JSOTF-P, the CJTF-Horn of Africa has also been conducting "humanitarian"missions and aid projects. Similar to the Philippines, Djibouti has also seen a dramatic increase in the amount of military aid it receives from the US. [39] As a sample of the US's new austere basing template, the CJTF-Horn of Africa has been described as the "model for future US military operations". [40]
Indeed, more deployments similar to that of the JSOTF-P and CJTF-Horn of Africa are planned in other locations around the world. [41] In 2004, former PACOM commander Thomas Fargo talked about expanding Special Operations Forces in the Pacific. [42] Apparently referring to the JSOTF-P, former secretary of defense Donald Rumsfeld also announced that the Pentagon would establish more "nodes for special operations forces". [43]
In his 2005 Annual Defense Report, Rumsfeld said that the US military "will improve its global force posture to increase strategic responsiveness while decreasing its overseas footprint and exposure. In place of traditional overseas bases with extensive infrastructure, we intend to use smaller forward operating bases with prepositioned equipment and rotational presence of personnel ... We will maintain a smaller forward-presence force in the Pacific while also stationing agile, expeditionary forces capable of rapid responses at our power projection bases." [44]
As evidenced by the fact that most Filipinos are not even aware of their presence and their actions, the JSOTF-P has managed to circumvent public opposition and legal restrictions governing the presence of foreign troops in the country. Hence, as Kaplan noted, "The JSOTF had succeeded as a political mechanism for getting an American base-of-sorts up and running ..." [45] C H Briscoe, command historian of the US Army Special Operations Command, under which the units of the JSOTF-P belong, concurs: "After more than 10 years, PACOM has reestablished an acceptable presence in the Philippines ..." [46] (Italics added.)
Though the Abu Sayyaf Group and other "terrorists" are the self-avowed targets of the JSOTFP, its location and capabilities allow it to aim much farther. In fact, the JSOTF-P's "area of operations" covers places in Mindanao in which the communist paramilitary group the New People's Army (NPA) is also active. The US had also tagged the NPA as a "foreign terrorist organization" and therefore as a legitimate target of the "war on terror". In fact, the US has also directly offered to more actively help in fighting the NPA. [47] As it is, US military assistance and training are directly contributing to the Philippine military's war against them.
Strategically positioned between two routes at the entrance of a major sea lane, the Makassar Strait, at the southwestern rim of the South China Sea, closer to Malaysia and Indonesia than most of the rest of the Philippines, the JSOTF-P, according to C H Briscoe, the unit's official historian, is "now better able to monitor the pulse of the region". [48] Indeed, Major General David Fridovich, commander of the US Special Operations Forces-Pacific, has stated that the area including the Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia is the "key region where we presently focus our indirect efforts". [49]
Rommel Banlaoi, an analyst with the National Defense College of the Philippines, finds, "The American war on terrorism has provided the US an excellent justification to hasten its reestablishment of a strategic presence in Southeast Asia." [50] Having secured that presence, the US has become closer to that country with "the greatest potential to compete militarily" with the US.
By getting the US "semi-permanently" based south of Luzon for the first time since World War II, Kaplan notes that "the larger-than-necessary base complex" in Zamboanga has delivered more than tactical benefits. [51] In the minds of the US Army strategists, Kaplan notes, "Combating Islamic terrorism in this region [Southeast Asia] carried a secondary benefit for the United States: it positioned the US for the future containment of nearby China."
Notes
1. Carolyn O Arguillas, "Q and A with US Ambassador Francis Ricciardone: Ops-Intel-fusion is not spying," MindaNews, February 28, 2005; Jojo Due, "Biggest RP-US military exercise starts next week," Philippine Business Daily Mirror, February 17, 2006.
2. Carolyn O Arguillas, "Q and A with US Ambassador Francis Ricciardone: Ops-Intel-fusion is not spying," MindaNews, February 28, 2005.
3. Admiral Thomas Fargo, Transcript of Hearing of US House of Representatives Committee on International Relations Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, June 26, 2003.
4. Karl Wilson, "US force in Asia to become smaller but deadlier," Daily Times, August 22, 2004.
5. United States Agency for International Development (USAID) Growth with Equity in Mindanao project website; Embassy of the United States of America, Manila, Republic of the Philippines, "Securing Peace in Mindanao through Diplomacy, Development, and Defense," August 2006.
6. In October 2005, for example, a huge US military ship, later identified as a high-speed vessel, was spotted off Basilan near Zamboanga City. The Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Department of Foreign Affairs gave conflicting versions as to the nature and mission of the ship, with the DFA spokesperson even initially indicating that they were not informed about its arrival only to subsequently claim that the US Embassy had actually requested permission for the ship's entry. ("US military ship sneaks into Southern RP, Sunstar, October 12, 2005, Manila Times, October 13, 05, Phil Star, October 28, 05.
7. US Department of Defense, National Defense Strategy 2005, Washington DC, pp. 18-19.
8. US Department of Defense, National Defense Strategy 2005, Washington DC, pp. 18-19.
9. Mark Lander, "Philippines Offers US its Troops and Bases," New York Times, October 2, 2001; Rufi Vigilar, "Philippines opens its ports to US military," CNN, September 18, 2001; Angel M Rabasa, "Southeast Asia After 9-11: Regional Trends and US Interests," Testimony presented to the Subcommittee on East Asia and the Pacific House of Representatives Committee on International Relations on December 12, 2001.
10. Thomas Lum and Larry A. Niksch, "The Republic of the Philippines: Background and US Relations," Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, January 10, 2006; Sheldon W Simon, "Theater Security Cooperation in the US Pacific Command," National Bureau of Asian Research Analysis, Volume 14, Number 2, August 2003.
11. Mutual Logistics Support Agreement Between the Department of Defense of the United States of America and the Department of National Defense of the Republic of the Philippines, November 21, 2002.
12. Sheldon W Simon, "Southeast Asia solidifies antiterrorism support, lobbies for postwar Iraq reconstruction," Pacific Forum CSIS Comparative Connections, Second Quarter 2003.
13. Overseas Basing Commission, Report to the President and Congress, Arlington, Virginia, August 15, 2005, p. H11.
14. Al Jacinto, "NGOs: Probe US military facilities," Manila Times, August 29, 2007.
15. Robert D Kaplan, Hog Pilots, Blue Water Grunts: The American Military in the Air, at Sea, and on the Ground (New York: Random House, 2007), pp. 88-90.
16. Thomas Fuller, "Subic Bay May be Up for Rent," International Herald Tribuna, July 13, 2001; "US Briefs RP on plans for using Subic, Clark," Inquirer, September 28, 2001.
17. Frida Berrigan, "Halliburton's Axis of Influence," In These Times, March 28, 2003.
18. Halliburton, "Press Release: Halliburton KBR to Evaluate Subic Bay Facilities," November 21, 2001.
19. Admiral Dennis Blair (Commander in Chief, US Pacific Command), Transcript of Press Conference, Manila, July 13, 2001.
20. Thomas J Garcia, "The Potential Role of the Philippines in US Naval Forward Presence," Thesis for US Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, December 2001, p. xiv.
21. Thomas J Garcia, "The Potential Role of the Philippines in US Naval Forward Presence," Thesis for US Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, December 2001, p. 30.
22. "US Briefs RP on plans for using Subic, Clark," Inquirer, September 28, 2001.
23. Council on Foreign Relations, The United States and Southeast Asia: A Policy Agenda for the New Administration, July 2001, pp. 47-48.
24. Robert Kaplan, Imperial Grunts: On the Ground with the American Military from Mongolia to the Philippines to Iraq and Beyond, New York: Vintage Books 2006, p.147.
25. In August 2007, Focus on the Global South publicized the granting by the US Department of Defense, through the US Naval Facilities Engineering Command (NAVFAC), of a six-month $14.4-million contract to a certain "Global Contingency Services LLC" of Irving, Texas for "operations support" for the Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines (JSOTF-P). According to its own website, the NAVFAC is the unit within the US military that is in charge of providing the US Navy with "operating, support, and training bases". It "manages the planning, design, and construction and provides public works support for US Naval shore installations around the world". Among their business lines are "bases development" and "contingency engineering". According to the announcement by the Pentagon, the contract awarded to Global Contingency Services LLC includes "all labor, supervision, management, tools, materials, equipment, facilities, transportation, incidental engineering, and other items necessary to provide facilities support services." Global Contingency Services LLC is a partnership between DynCorp International, Parsons Global Services, and PWC Logistics. The $14.4 million contract is actually part of a bigger $450-million five-year contract for Global Contingency Services to "provide a full range of world-wide contingency and disaster-response services, including humanitarian assistance and interim or transitional base-operating support services". According to DynCorp's website, this will include "facility operations and maintenance; air operations; port operations; health care; supply and warehousing; galley; housing support; emergency services; security, fire, and rescue; vehicle equipment; and incidental construction." Contingency Response Services LLC describes its work as encompassing "operating forces support", "community support", and "base support". According to the Defense Industry Daily publication, the contract also includes "morale, welfare, and recreation support". The specific contract for work for the JSOTF-P is expected to be completed in January 2008 but other contracts may follow as part of the $450 million-package. ("Contracts, June 6, 2007," US Department of Defense; Press Release, "DynCorp International and JV Partners Win $450 million NAVFAC Contract," DynCorp International, November 2, 2006; "Contingency Response Services", DynCorp International; Defense Industry Daily, "$14.4M to help US SOCOM in the Philippines," June 8, 2007; Ethan Butterfield, "DynCorp lands $450M Navy Contingency Services Deal," Washington Technology, November 3, 2006.
26. "US denies building bases in Mindanao," GMANews.TV, August 27, 2007.
27. Veronica Uy, "VFACom Chief Denies US bases in Mindanao," Inquirer.net, August 24, 2007.
28. Robert D Kaplan, Hog Pilots, Blue Water Grunts: The American Military in the Air, at Sea, and on the Ground (New York: Random House, 2007), p. 319.
29 T D Flack, "Special Operations Force Aiding an Important Ally," Stars and Stripes, March 11, 2007; T D Flack, "Special Operations Force Aiding an Important Ally," Stars and Stripes, March 11, 2007; Colonel Gregory Wilson, "Anatomy of a Successful COIN Operation: OEF-Philippines and the Indirect Approach," Military Review, November to December 2006.
30. At start of the deployment in January 2002, there were supposed to be 160 to 250 who were joining. (Steve Vogel, "Americans Arrive in Philippines US Special Forces To Aid Filipino Army In Threatened Areas," Washington Post, January 16, 2002; Fe B Zamora, "All US troops will leave on July 31, says Wurster," Philippine Daily Inquirer, July 1, 2002; Pat Roque, "US Special Forces in Philippines," Associated Press, February 18, 2002; Bill Gertz and Rowan Scarborough, "Philippine confusion," Washington Times, February 8, 2002). In November 2002, the Army Magazine reported that there were 260 members of the task force were in the southern Philippines. (Army Magazine, "News Call," November 1, 2002). In February 2003, 350 Special Forces were reportedly scheduled to be sent to Sulu but this was postponed. (Eric Schmitt, "US combat force of 1700 is headed to the Philippines", New York Times, February 21, 2003; Bradley Graham, "US Bolsters Philippine Force," Washington Post, February 21, 2003) In October 2003, 300 Special Forces were reported to be in Basilan ("US spy aircraft deployed in Philippines," October 13, 2003 The News International (Pakistan). By February 2006, 250 more troops were reported to be joining those who were already in Sulu but it was not clear how many were still there at that time ("RP-US to conduct war games amid 'rape' controversy," Philipine Daily Inquirer, January 10, 2006; "No time frame of US troops' stay in Sulu," Mindanews, January 17, 2006). Shortly after, US military spokesperson Captain Burrel Parmer announced that 400 US troops will be Sulu for various projects. (Ding Cervantes, "5,500 US military personnel coming for Balikatan 2006," Philippine Star, February 17, 2006). In September 2006, 114 US troops were reported to have arrived in Zamboanga City as part of the "normal rotation" of soldiers under JSOTF-P, according to the US Embassy. (Julie Alipala, "100 GIs held at Zambo immigration," Philippine Daily Inquirer, September 28, 2006). In February 2007, US today reported 450 and Reuters put the number at 100 (Paul Wiseman, "In Philippines, US Making Progress in War on Terror," USA Today, Februay 13, 2007; "Philippines increases security for US forces," Reuters, February 26, 2007).
31. "Civilians want probe on US military's alleged supervision in Sulu war," Mindanews, November 24, 2005.
32. Colonel David Maxwell, "Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines: What Would Sun-Tzu say?" Military Review, May-June 2004; Members of the 1st Special Forces Group, "The history of the 1st SF Group in the Republic of the Philippines; 1957-2002," Special Warfare, June 2002; C H Briscoe, "Why the Philippines: ARSOF's expanded mission in the war on terror," Special Warfare, September 2004; "Interview with Vice Admiral Eric T Olson," Special Operations Technology Online, July 13, 2004, Volume 2, Issue 4; Colonel. Gregory Wilson, "Anatomy of a Successful COIN Operation: OEF-Philippines and the Indirect Approach," Military Review, November to December 2006.
33. John Hendren, "Rebels shoot at US Troops in the Philippines," Los Angeles Times, June 18, 2002; Army Magazine (published by the Association of the United States Army), "News Call," August 1, 2002; Roel Pareno, "Gunfire hits Huey with US troops," Philippine Star, March 9, 2006.
34. See Herbert Docena, Unconventional Warfare: Are US Special Forces Engaged in an 'Offensive War' in the Philippines?" (Quezon City: Focus on the Global South, 2007).
35. "American troops aboard Humvee spotted leading military convoy," Philippine Daily Inquirer, August 15, 2007.
36. Eliza Griswold, "Waging Peace in the Philippines", The Smithsonian, December 2006.
37. Major Kevin T Henderson, US Army, "Army Special Operations Forces and Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) Integration: Something a Joint Task Force Commander should Consider," monograph, United States Army Command and General Staff College, School of Advanced Military Studies, 19 May 2004; another writer talks about a "Forward Operating Base 11" in the southern Philippines (Cherilyn Walley, "Impact of the semi-permissive environment on force protection in Philippine engagements," Special Warfare, September 2004); T D Flack, "When Visiting Jolo, Show a Little Courtesy, Please," Stars and Stripes, March 12, 2007.
38. Alain Lallemand, "Profiteering on Location," International Consortium of Investigative Journalists, May 22, 2007.
39, Center for Defense Information, "Worldwide Reorientation of US Military Basing: Part II: Central Asia, Southwest Asia, and the Pacific," October 7, 2003; Stanley A Weiss, "After Iraq, a New US Military Model," International Herald Tribune, December 27, 2006.
40. Greg Jaffe, "Rumsfeld details big military shift in new document," Wall Street Journal, March 11, 2005.
41. Admiral Thomas B Fargo, "Regarding the Defense Global Forces Postu
re Review," Testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, September 23, 2004.
42. Donald H Rumsfeld (US Secretary of Defense), Testimony before Senate Armed Services Committee, Washington DC, September 23, 2004.
43. Donald H Rumsfeld (US Secretary of Defense), Annual Report to the President and the Congress 2005, p. 36-37.
44. Robert Kaplan, Imperial Grunts: On the Ground with the American Military from Mongolia to the Philippines to Iraq and Beyond, New York: Vintage Books 2006, p.150.
45. C H Briscoe, "Reflections and Observations on ARSOF Operations During Balikatan 02-1," Special Warfare, September 2004.
46. Christine Avendano, "US willing to help RP troops in fight vs NPA," Inquirer.net, June 28, 2007.
47. C H Briscoe, "Reflections and Observations on ARSOF Operations During Balikatan 02-1," Special Warfare, September 2004.
48. "Interview with Major General David Fridovich," Special Operations Technology SOTECH, April 23, 2007.
49. Rommel C Banlaoi, The War on Terrorism in Southeast Asia, (Manila: Rex Book Store Inc., 2004).
50. Robert Kaplan, Imperial Grunts: On the Ground with the American Military from Mongolia to the Philippines to Iraq and Beyond (New York: Vintage Books, 2006), p.178.
51. Robert Kaplan, Imperial Grunts: On the Ground with the American Military from Mongolia to the Philippines to Iraq and Beyond (New York: Vintage Books 2006), p.134.
Herbert Docena is author of "At the Door of all the East: The Philippines in United States Military Strategy", a new report launched by Focus on the Global South, an international policy research institute.
By Herbert Docena - Asia Times Online Ltd
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